Groundwater emerged as a major source of irrigation in India during the mid-1970s. However, a large expansion in well irrigation due to a massive rural electrification programme, government policies of promoting private tube well construction and large subsidies on electricity for agricultural use resulted in groundwater over-abstraction in many semi-arid and arid regions of India. In addition, most of the direct and indirect measures to regulate groundwater use have met with little success and have been largely ineffective in arresting groundwater over-exploitation. This paper reviews the institutional and market-based instruments that are now being advocated by scholars and practitioners as potential instruments for sustainable groundwater use. The review mainly focuses on research that examined the viability and impacts of establishing private and tradable water rights in groundwater and pro rata pricing of electricity for irrigation use as instruments to arrest the problems of groundwater over-exploitation in India.
Introduction
Groundwater plays an important role in India's agrarian economy, supporting the livelihoods and food security of millions of people. Since the mid-1970s, the area of irrigated crop land using groundwater has expanded rapidly with the spread of green revolution technology (Dhawan, 1989) . This was the period when farmers made extensive use of groundwater in irrigated agriculture. It came as no surprise that in India in the period 1960-1999, irrigation from tube wells and other wells grew by a factor of over four (Scott & Sharma, 2009) . At present, groundwater sustains nearly 60 per cent of the net irrigated area, and about two-thirds of irrigated food production depends on irrigation from groundwater wells (Kumar, 2007) . Almost all major agricultural states in India heavily depend on groundwater for irrigation. In Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Gujarat, groundwater caters for 60-87 per cent of the net irrigated area.
It has been estimated that the crop yield in groundwater irrigated areas is one-third to one-half higher than those irrigated by surface sources (Dhawan, 1995) . The productivity of groundwater irrigation is more than that of surface water because it is available at the point of use, requires minimum conveyance infrastructure, and is available on demand and with high application efficiency, as the farmers have to pay the cost of lifting (Chambers, 1988; Dhawan, 1989) . Thus, to optimize crop yields and maximize profits from agriculture, farmers intensively use groundwater. Although it has contributed significantly to the agricultural and economic development of the country, of late it has thrown up many challenges from the point of view of governance and management (Singh, 2002) . One of the major problems is its unsustainable use in agriculture, which mainly emerged due to the absence of institutional arrangements (such as national or provincial water laws dealing with groundwater) and investment in management agencies (Kemper, 2007) . A lack of well-defined ownership rights in groundwater also contributed to its unsustainable use (Saleth, 1994; Narain, 1998; Kumar, 2000 Kumar, , 2005 . As a result, many aquifers in the country are now under severe stress and groundwater cannot wholly sustain the production that has been initiated (Kemper, 2007) . Free or heavily subsidized power, as offered to well irrigators in India, is also leading to a serious erosion of both water and energy economies (Kumar et al., 2013a) . The overdraft of aquifers beyond the recharge potential has already resulted in depletion and groundwater scarcity across many regions in India. For instance, between 2000 and 2008, groundwater levels fell by more than 2 m in parts of Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab, western Uttar Pradesh, western Andhra Pradesh and the north-west part of Tamil Nadu (CGWB, 2011).
In the above context, this paper discusses the extent of groundwater over-exploitation in India, the concerns emerging from its unsustainable use, and various measures undertaken to promote its sustainable use. Thereafter, the potential of two market instruments, namely, water rights and energy pricing in the agriculture sector as instruments for sustainable groundwater management, is assessed.
Genesis and scale of groundwater over-exploitation
Groundwater use for irrigation in India has increased steadily and surpassed canal irrigation in the early 1970s. From the mid-1960s onwards, it was actually energized (electricity and diesel) irrigation that increased more, with a growth in electric pumps numbering more than diesel pumps ( Figure 1 ). The expansion of energized (electricity) irrigation is attributed to: (1) government programmes to promote private tube wells, supported by soft loans to farmers and rural electrification (Scott & Sharma, 2009) ; and (2) the general shift to a flat-rate electricity tariff for agricultural use in most states ( Janakarajan & Moench, 2006; Scott & Sharma, 2009) . Such ambitious interventions led to over-dependence and overuse of groundwater for irrigation in many parts of the country. This resulted in a falling groundwater level, a reduction in supply, saline water encroachment (Singh, 2002; Narayanamoorthy, 2010) , drying of the spring and shallow aquifers, increased cost of lifting, reduction in free flow, and even local subsidence in some places (Singh, 2002) . Absence of clear ownership rights in groundwater also resulted in its excessive use. In several regions, farmers kept on excavating deeper wells and drilling deeper bore wells in order to have more water for irrigation (Bassi, 2011) .
Alarm about groundwater over-exploitation was voiced for the first time almost three decades ago (Kumar, 2007; Kumar & Singh, 2008) . Subsequently, it echoed in many parts of Andhra Pradesh (Chandra et al., 2006) , Karnataka (Premchander et al., 2003) , Maharashtra (Pathak et al., 1999) , North Gujarat (Ranade & Kumar, 2004) and Tamil Nadu (Palanisami, 2002) . According to the Central Groundwater Board Report (2011), 27 per cent of the total assessed units in Karnataka, 36 per cent of the total blocks in Tamil Nadu, 58.6 per cent of the total blocks in Haryana, 69.5 per cent of the total blocks in Rajasthan and 80 per cent of the total blocks in Punjab are over-exploited. These figures are well above the average figure (which is 14 per cent) of the country's total over-exploited blocks/units. However, Kumar & Singh (2008) argued that the current assessment of groundwater over-exploitation did not provide a clear picture of the actual extent of over-exploitation in both absolute and relative terms. It tends to underestimate the magnitude of groundwater over-exploitation in India, which can be assessed from the negative social, economic and ecological consequences of over-development. From that perspective, many districts in Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu could actually be over-exploited, although the official figures show that they fall under 'safe', 'semi-critical' or 'critical' categories. The regions that have serious problems are alluvial Punjab, both the hard and alluvial areas of Gujarat, and the hard rock areas of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.
Nonetheless, large-scale over-exploitation of the groundwater resource has serious consequences for the Indian subcontinent where hard rock formations cover almost 70 per cent of the total area. In these hard rock area, mainly in water-scarce western and peninsular India, the recharge of aquifers is comparatively low and often occurs where there are fissures or cracks or weathering in the rock formations. Therefore, any form of over-exploitation seriously affects the groundwater availability and contributes to well failures in these regions (Bassi, 2011) . On the other side, there are areas in the Gangetic river basin, mostly comprising alluvial aquifers in Bihar and West Bengal, with comparatively less development of groundwater resources (39 and 42 per cent respectively). The reasons are: (1) small and fragmented land holdings; (2) a low number of water extraction mechanisms; (3) the high cost of energy; and (4) the low investment capacity of small and marginal farmers (Sharma et al., 2008) . Along with economic water scarcity, these are the areas that also face scarcity of arable land. As a result, the development of groundwater for irrigation and overall agricultural growth is very low in this water-rich eastern part of India (Kumar et al., 2011) . 
Growing concerns
The growing dependence on groundwater threatens land productivity, water resources sustainability and power sector viability. Continued agricultural growth is vital, but the farming sector must accept its share of the effects of groundwater depletion and bankrupt power utilities (Kumar et al., 2011) . The annual operating losses of the electricity boards are around INR 260 billion (where a billion is 10 9 ; 1 US$ equals INR 60) and are growing rapidly (Lim, 2001; Gulati, 2002) . The poor financial working of many of the State Electricity Boards (SEB) in larger parts of peninsular and western India is attributed to highly subsidized power available to the farming sector, which accounts for a major chunk of the electricity consumption in the respective states, and to power thefts. While some states, such as Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, provide 100 per cent subsidized electricity to the farming sector, some states, such as Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, do not meter agricultural power consumption, and charge electricity on the basis of connected load. In the last 5 years, i.e. from 2007-08 to 2011-12, the energy subsidy to agricultural consumers increased by about 30 per cent. This increase was the main reason why the commercial losses for power utilities and electricity departments increased by more than 100 per cent ( Figure 2 ) (Planning Commission, 2011) . This deteriorating financial condition severely limits the ability of the SEB to supply good-quality power to the farming sector (Kumar, 2005) . Between 1980-81 and 2009-10, the gap between the average cost of electricity supply and the average price paid (from all sectors including agriculture) has increased from INR 0.1 per unit to INR 0.9 per unit. There is a consensus among researchers that rural electrification and power subsidies in the farming sector have actually triggered exponential growth in groundwater irrigation in India (Moench, 1995) . Many have argued that the current method of pricing power consumption in the farming sector does not reflect the actual unit consumption, and creates an incentive for the wasteful use of both power and groundwater (Saleth, 1997; Kumar & Singh, 2001) .
The groundwater management in India has focused on many direct and indirect measures such as: artificial recharge in areas facing problems of overdraft; direct regulation of groundwater abstraction through state legislation; indirect regulations through well financing and other leverages; local management of groundwater by user groups; and the establishment of cooperative property rights in Fig. 2 . Amount of energy subsidies for agricultural consumers and commercial losses (with subsidy) for power utilities and electricity departments. (Source: Author's own analysis using information presented in Planning Commission Report (2011)). groundwater. However, most of these measures have met with little success and have been ineffective in arresting groundwater depletion ( Janakarajan, 2002; Kumar, 2005) . Moreover, the 1992 Model Groundwater Bill, which advocates well permits, water metering and withdrawal limits, has not been properly adopted by any state so far (Saleth & Dinar, 2000) . But recently, direct institutional mechanisms, such as the establishment of water rights and the effective enforcement of legislations, and indirect market-based or economic instruments, such as power rationing (Scott & Shah, 2004; Shah et al., 2008) and pro rata electricity pricing (Gupta, 2002; Kumar, 2005; Kumar et al., 2011) , for managing groundwater demand are being increasingly advocated. Saleth (1997) argued that even an imperfect system of groundwater rights will have more sustainable benefits than the most perfectly designed power tariff structure. Many other scholars in the past have also suggested the establishment of property rights as a means to build institutional capability to ensure equity in allocation and efficiency in use of water across sectors (Saleth, 1994; Narain, 1998; Kumar, 2000) . Other institutional mechanisms, such as groundwater legislations, to check and control overdraft have fallen flat due to their social and political implications. Saleth (1994) noted that the issue of effective water rights is particularly important for irrigation water, which has significant implications for agricultural sustainability. Scott & Shah (2004) claimed that strict rationing of the power supply to agriculture in India is having an unintended consequence of limiting the rate of groundwater exploitation. In addition, based on power reforms in Gujarat, Shah et al. (2008) argued that metering the electricity used by tube wells and charging farmers at rates based on power consumption are detrimental to the marginal and landless farmers who largely depend on groundwater markets, and hence it is unlikely to happen in the near future. Therefore, the best intermediate strategy is to provide good-quality rationed power but at a common flat-rate tariff to all tube wells regardless of whether they are metered or not metered. Citing an example from the water-rich eastern state of West Bengal, Mukherji (2007) supported the view that a high flat-rate electricity tariff encourages the development of water markets whereby the water buyers, mostly small and marginal farmers, benefit from access to irrigation. But these views do not hold true for western and peninsular India, which are water scarce and already facing an increasing problem of groundwater depletion due to continuing subsidized energy regimes for groundwater pumping. Researchers have indicated that energy rationing without metering and unit pricing has failed to motivate farmers to use water and electricity efficiently (Kumar, 2005; Malik, 2009; IRAP, 2010) . For instance, in Gujarat where the Jyotigram scheme of rationalized power supply to the farming sector was launched during 2003-06, agricultural power consumption has actually increased from 9,571 million units in 2002-03 to 11,009 million units in 2006-07 (data source: Gujarat Electricity Board). Nevertheless, Kumar (2005) showed that unit pricing of electricity influences groundwater use efficiency and productivity positively. In fact, Kumar et al. (2011) provided empirical evidence that raising power tariffs in the farming sector to achieve efficiency and sustainability of groundwater use is both socially and economically viable. In the light of the above discussion, the emergence of water rights and unit pricing of electricity as serious options for achieving sustainable and efficient groundwater use will now be discussed.
Water rights for sustainable groundwater use
The spatial and temporal variation in both water availability and demand is very high in India. In eastern regions, such as Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, although water resources are abundant, the demand for irrigation is very low. In addition, problems of waterlogging due to rising groundwater levels caused by flooding and excessive irrigation from canals are encountered (Shah, 2001) . On the other hand, demand for water is extremely high in the water-scarce arid and semi-arid regions of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, where groundwater is the major source of water for all purposes. In areas facing groundwater overdevelopment problems, pumping regulations through groundwater legislation, control of institutional financing for well development and restrictions on power connections for pumps have been ineffective (Kumar, 2000; Janakarajan, 2002) .
Over-exploitation occurs when users ignore the effects of their actions on the resource and on other users when pursuing their own self-interests (Johansson et al., 2002) . For instance, in Gujarat, where there are well-developed informal groundwater markets, water is sold without considering the limits of the resource. Although the allocation of purchased water may be more efficient than in the absence of such markets, the groundwater level is nevertheless being drawn down (Kemper, 2007) . Under such a scenario, the absence of well-defined private property rights can be a major source of uncertainty about the negative environmental impacts of resource use, leading to its unsustainable use (Pearce & Warford, 1993; Kay et al., 1997; Kumar, 2003) . Once the resource becomes scarce, well-defined groundwater use rights can become a key mechanism to control over-abstraction (Kemper, 2007) .
However, rights to access groundwater are attached to land ownership rights in India, which means that anybody owning a piece of land can drill or dig a well in it and pump out groundwater. Since the land and well ownership is heavily skewed, there is an inherent inequality in access to groundwater (Kumar, 2007; Sarkar, 2011; Kumar et al., 2013b) . This is substantiated by the fact that only a very small fraction of marginal and small farmers own wells and pump sets, against 37 and 69 per cent of large farmers owning wells and pump sets respectively. In addition, the proportion of the area irrigated by wells is only 14 per cent of the total area for small and marginal farmers, against 29 per cent for medium and large farmers (Kumar et al., 2013b) . A formal system of water rights can mitigate this inequity in groundwater access and can also promote its sustainable use (Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994; Saleth, 1994; Narain, 1998; Kumar, 2005) . Under a formal water rights regime, small farmers and the poor will gain water rights, which would empower them and can serve as additional collateral (Mohanty & Gupta, 2002) . Saleth (1994) noted that the more robust, though politically and administratively harder, options, such as the institution of a water rights regime, could effectively limit and regulate both individual and collective water withdrawal and use from subsurface sources. However, the water rights administrative agency has to ensure that the water rights granted will not result in annual pumping quantities that exceed safe yield (Peck, 2003) . In addition, as well-defined groundwater-use rights entitle individual users to an abstraction allocation at a certain point in time (Kemper, 2007) , it will reduce the uncertainty in rights and water conflicts (Molle, 2004) and provide a better resolution to the monopoly creation of the water sellers under the informal market structure (Mohanty & Gupta, 2002) . Frederick (1993) pointed out that if the rights are allocated only to use water, it can create incentives to use it even when there is no good use for it. Therefore, water rights have to be tradable. Saleth (1994) emphasized that the transferability and exchangeability of water rights are crucial to capture and reflect the scarcity value of water and guide water allocation. Provencher & Burt (1994) established that the private property rights regime, in which tradable permits are granted to the in situ groundwater stock, is a promising alternative to central (optimal) control. Well-defined tradable rights (especially in the context of developing countries) formalize and secure the existing water rights enjoyed by water users; economize on transaction costs; induce water users to consider the full cost of water; and provide incentives for water users to accept and reduce many of the negative externalities inherent in irrigation (Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994) . Thus, the highest value of water use is taken into account and provides an incentive to users for more efficient use and reallocation of surplus water to a higher-valued use (Kumar, 2003; Kemper, 2007) . Empirical evidence from the functioning of groundwater irrigation institutions in North Gujarat shows that under a system of fixed volumetric water use rights, farmers prefer to grow mustard, which is less water-intensive than wheat, although mustard has a much lower land-use productivity than wheat, but gets the same water-use productivity (Kumar, 2000 (Kumar, , 2005 . Kumar (2005) also found that with volumetric pricing of water and its rationing as found in the shareholders of tube-well partnerships, farmers allocate their entitlements for growing crops that give higher economic returns from every unit of water used for crop production. Thus, a system of marketable rights to water provides an incentive to efficiently use the allocated water and gain additional income through the sale of saved water. Considering that agricultural use accounts for more than 80 per cent of water use, this modest transfer of water from agriculture could meet growing urban and industrial demands. As evident from other parts of the world, the infrastructure required for such inter-sectoral water transfers would cost much less than the large hydraulic infrastructures planned to meet growing water demand for domestic and industrial uses (Mohanty & Gupta, 2002) . Also, allocating water through formal markets will economize on rent-seeking costs (a hidden transaction cost in publicly managed irrigation systems) (Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994) . However, to minimize the transaction cost of identifying profitable opportunities for transferring water and to monitor water transfers, processes will have to be initiated for creating participatory institutions at various levelsfrom aquifers to watersheds, and then to villages and individual usersfor allocating volumetric water rights, and monitoring and enforcing water use. This would be arduous (Kumar, 2000) . But for a tradable groundwater-use right to resolve over-exploitation of groundwater aquifers, a definite proportion of the aquifer volume needs to be reserved to achieve a certain stabilization (Kemper, 2007) on sustainable yield considerations (Kumar, 2005) .
Energy pricing as a viable option
It is common knowledge that users have an incentive to use a resource more efficiently when it is priced appropriately. If the price is right, users will have incentives to use less and make the resource available for others. In the case of groundwater, there are two options for pricing: the first is to price the resource itself; and the second is to price energy (Kemper, 2007) . Energy pricing is more important in developing economies like that of India, where energy subsidies to agriculture are estimated between 1.9 billion and 6.5 billion US$ per year. Further, the electricity subsidies to agriculture in India are estimated to be 26 per cent of the gross fiscal deficit. These range from 80 per cent in Madhya Pradesh and Haryana to 50 per cent in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka, and to about 40 per cent in Rajasthan, Punjab and Tamil Nadu (Bhatia, 2005) . These are also the states that are experiencing tremendous groundwater over-abstraction for irrigation. Hence, the 'pro-poor' subsidies regime has affected both the groundwater situation and the state finances alike; and it has already turned 'anti-poor' in several regions of peninsular and western India, where the aquifers are already over-exploited and only the rich and large farm owners can afford to abstract water.
In the past, many researchers have suggested the rational pricing of electricity as a potential fiscal tool for sustainable groundwater use in India (Moench, 1995; Saleth, 1997; Kumar, 2005; Kumar et al., 2011) . Many argued that a flat-rate-based pricing structure in the farming sector creates an incentive for farmers to over-extract groundwater, as the marginal cost of extraction is zero (Kumar, 2003 (Kumar, , 2005 . Although some researchers have argued that since the price at which groundwater is traded in regions like North Gujarat reflects the scarcity value of the resource, a tariff increase would not have a significant impact on groundwater use (Mohanty & Ebrahim, 1995) . Such arguments are contested on the grounds that the actual annual demand for irrigation services in hourly terms is much smaller in comparison to the total amount of groundwater the well owners can pump out during a year and that they are not confronted with the actual cost of using excess water for irrigating their own fields (Kumar & Singh, 2001) . Nevertheless, some scholars continue to advocate that the flat-tariff regime with power supply rationing and supply management is a highly rational, sophisticated and scientific pricing regime (Shah et al., 2007) . But field research suggests that power rationing with good-quality supply but without metering and unit pricing has failed to arrest groundwater over-exploitation (IRAP, 2010) .
It is quite true that the policies with regard to water and electricity pricing are guided by strong political and economic considerations (Moench, 1995) . Once a subsidized regime is set, it is politically very difficult to return to energy prices that actually reflect the cost of energy to the state (Kemper, 2007) . But the recent past has seen some remarkable success in introducing metering, and charging a power tariff based on actual consumption in some states. These include West Bengal (Mukherji et al., 2009) , Uttarakhand (Bassi et al., 2007) and Gujarat (Kumar et al., 2011) . In many Indian states, farmers have been crying foul over the deteriorating power supply, which is free or highly subsidized, and instead have been demanding a good-quality power supply with a price. A field research study undertaken in Madhya Pradesh confirmed that it is actually the small and marginal farmers who have been affected most by the subsidized power-driven groundwater over-exploitation, as they have limited resources and access to groundwater. It was further analysed that the aggregate net returns per farmer for small landholders were 41 per cent lower than those of the large landowners. Similarly, aggregate net returns per well for small landholders were 39 per cent lower than those of the large landowners (Bassi et al., 2008) .
Citing the case of the aquifers of the Lower Jordan River Basin, Venot & Molle (2008) argued that any substantial increase in volumetric charges is unlikely to enable the regulation of groundwater abstraction and would further decrease the income from low-value or extensive crops. They emphasized that a significant reduction will be achieved only through policies that reduce the number of wells in use. However, the empirical studies carried out so far on the issue of energy pricing on groundwater use in India show that the introduction of consumption-based pricing of electricity and an increase in unit charges, if combined with improvement in the quality of power supply, will lead to greater agricultural income and a reduction in the use of groundwater (IRMA/UNICEF, 2001; Kumar, 2005; Kumar et al., 2011) . Moreover, legislation aimed at controlling the number of irrigation wells in India has fallen flat, as groundwater ownership is virtually attached to land rights. Scott & Shah (2004) held that a zero or flat-rate tariff provides no incentive to limit pumping; however, the increases in the metered tariff required for elasticdemand behaviour are likely to be significantly higher than are acceptable to either farmers or politicians (also refer to de Fraiture & Perry (2002) ). However, Kumar (2005) , on the basis of the analysis of primary data collected from North Gujarat and a more recent study carried out in South Bihar, Eastern UP and North Gujarat (Kumar et al., 2011) , established that the levels of pricing at which the demand for electricity and groundwater becomes elastic to tariff are socio-economically viable. Some researchers have also questioned the feasibility of installing meters at such a large scale as, according to them, there is a huge transaction cost involved (Shah et al., 2007) . But, as Kumar (2009) notes:
'these were rather excuses used by officials and other functionaries of electricity departments to cover up the revenue losses due to poor operational efficiencies, resulting from transmission losses and distribution losses, which included thefts. Also, unmetered connections attract more bribes, as detecting power theft is much more difficult under a flat rate system. A recent survey in North Gujarat showed that farmers are resorting to under-reporting of connected load, after the implementation of the much-publicized Jyotigram scheme in villages, which made direct power theft from feeder line difficult.'
With the advent of pre-paid electronic meters, which work through scratch cards (Zekri, 2008) , and work on internet or mobile technology and remotely-sensed meters, the transaction cost of metering can be minimized to a great extent (Kumar et al., 2011) . The use of a remotely-sensed meter can also avoid the huge transaction cost of metering. The technology used in these meters enables them to be installed in places where tampering by farmers and meter readers will be difficult, yet where readings can be easily obtained. This is now used for measuring electricity consumption by agro wells in West Bengal (Mukherji et al., 2009) .
However, such fiscal instruments are required in regions experiencing overdraft. In India, overdraft appears to be occurring in regions that experience low-to-medium rainfall with high aridity (Kumar & Singh, 2008) . Metering and pro rata pricing of electricity may not be required in those regions that have abundant groundwater, if the issue of cost recovery in the electricity supply can be addressed through other methods of pricing. The reason is that metering is essentially an economic decision and the benefits of metering have to justify the efforts involved (Arghyam/IRAP, 2010) . In water-abundant regions, the social and economic benefits of groundwater conservation through metering may not be very significant. Therefore, in those regions, the pricing structure should be designed in such a way that it encourages greater use of groundwater for boosting agricultural production. However, caution should be exercised, to ensure that it does not create negative effects on the equity in the distribution of energy subsidy benefits. The flat system of pricing, based on the connected load of the pump set, can be a good basis for pricing electricity in groundwater-abundant areas (Kumar et al., 2011) .
Conclusion
The number of groundwater wells in India increased from about 100,000 in 1960 to nearly 12 million in 2006. This rapid increase in groundwater use gives clear signs of aquifer depletion, which requires some immediate solution. In an environment characterized by poor implementation of state regulations regarding groundwater use and by the proliferation of an informal groundwater economy across the country, users are interested in abstracting only as much water as they can. The free or subsidized energy supply to agriculture has also provided incentives to users to over-exploit the aquifers and use groundwater inefficiently. Although it was started as a pro-poor policy initiative, energy subsidies have already turned into a pro-rich policy by allowing resource-rich farmers to appropriate groundwater at a very low cost.
The enforcement of private and tradable property rights in groundwater can together bring about a significant increase in farm outputs, with a reduction in the aggregate demand for water in agriculture (Kumar, 2005; Kumar et al., 2011 Kumar et al., , 2013a . It will also bring about more equitable access to, and control over, the water available from groundwater for food production and ensure household-level food security. This has to be complemented by the pro rata pricing of electricity in the farming sector, with improved quality and reliability of the supplied power. Whether the electricity supply is restricted or not, a flat-rate tariff can do little to control groundwater and energy use in agriculture. Therefore, metering and pro rata pricing of electricity have to receive priority in naturally water-scarce regions that also experience groundwater overdraft. In the groundwater-abundant eastern regions of India, however, the pricing structure in the farming sector should be designed in such a way that it encourages greater use of groundwater. However, in such areas there is a limit to agricultural growth as arable land is scarce there.
